crypto/ecies: improve concatKDF (#20836)
This removes a bunch of weird code around the counter overflow check in concatKDF and makes it actually work for different hash output sizes. The overflow check worked as follows: concatKDF applies the hash function N times, where N is roundup(kdLen, hashsize) / hashsize. N should not overflow 32 bits because that would lead to a repetition in the KDF output. A couple issues with the overflow check: - It used the hash.BlockSize, which is wrong because the block size is about the input of the hash function. Luckily, all standard hash functions have a block size that's greater than the output size, so concatKDF didn't crash, it just generated too much key material. - The check used big.Int to compare against 2^32-1. - The calculation could still overflow before reaching the check. The new code in concatKDF doesn't check for overflow. Instead, there is a new check on ECIESParams which ensures that params.KeyLen is < 512. This removes any possibility of overflow. There are a couple of miscellaneous improvements bundled in with this change: - The key buffer is pre-allocated instead of appending the hash output to an initially empty slice. - The code that uses concatKDF to derive keys is now shared between Encrypt and Decrypt. - There was a redundant invocation of IsOnCurve in Decrypt. This is now removed because elliptic.Unmarshal already checks whether the input is a valid curve point since Go 1.5. Co-authored-by: Felix Lange <fjl@twurst.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import (
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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@@ -44,7 +45,6 @@ import (
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var (
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ErrImport = fmt.Errorf("ecies: failed to import key")
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ErrInvalidCurve = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid elliptic curve")
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ErrInvalidParams = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid ECIES parameters")
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ErrInvalidPublicKey = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid public key")
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ErrSharedKeyIsPointAtInfinity = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared key is point at infinity")
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ErrSharedKeyTooBig = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared key params are too big")
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@@ -138,57 +138,39 @@ func (prv *PrivateKey) GenerateShared(pub *PublicKey, skLen, macLen int) (sk []b
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}
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var (
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ErrKeyDataTooLong = fmt.Errorf("ecies: can't supply requested key data")
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ErrSharedTooLong = fmt.Errorf("ecies: shared secret is too long")
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ErrInvalidMessage = fmt.Errorf("ecies: invalid message")
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)
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var (
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big2To32 = new(big.Int).Exp(big.NewInt(2), big.NewInt(32), nil)
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big2To32M1 = new(big.Int).Sub(big2To32, big.NewInt(1))
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)
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func incCounter(ctr []byte) {
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if ctr[3]++; ctr[3] != 0 {
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return
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}
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if ctr[2]++; ctr[2] != 0 {
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return
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}
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if ctr[1]++; ctr[1] != 0 {
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return
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}
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if ctr[0]++; ctr[0] != 0 {
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return
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}
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}
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// NIST SP 800-56 Concatenation Key Derivation Function (see section 5.8.1).
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func concatKDF(hash hash.Hash, z, s1 []byte, kdLen int) (k []byte, err error) {
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if s1 == nil {
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s1 = make([]byte, 0)
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}
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reps := ((kdLen + 7) * 8) / (hash.BlockSize() * 8)
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if big.NewInt(int64(reps)).Cmp(big2To32M1) > 0 {
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fmt.Println(big2To32M1)
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return nil, ErrKeyDataTooLong
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}
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counter := []byte{0, 0, 0, 1}
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k = make([]byte, 0)
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for i := 0; i <= reps; i++ {
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hash.Write(counter)
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func concatKDF(hash hash.Hash, z, s1 []byte, kdLen int) []byte {
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counterBytes := make([]byte, 4)
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k := make([]byte, 0, roundup(kdLen, hash.Size()))
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for counter := uint32(1); len(k) < kdLen; counter++ {
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(counterBytes, counter)
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hash.Reset()
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hash.Write(counterBytes)
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hash.Write(z)
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hash.Write(s1)
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k = append(k, hash.Sum(nil)...)
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hash.Reset()
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incCounter(counter)
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k = hash.Sum(k)
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}
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return k[:kdLen]
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}
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k = k[:kdLen]
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return
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// roundup rounds size up to the next multiple of blocksize.
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func roundup(size, blocksize int) int {
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return size + blocksize - (size % blocksize)
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}
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// deriveKeys creates the encryption and MAC keys using concatKDF.
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func deriveKeys(hash hash.Hash, z, s1 []byte, keyLen int) (Ke, Km []byte) {
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K := concatKDF(hash, z, s1, 2*keyLen)
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Ke = K[:keyLen]
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Km = K[keyLen:]
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hash.Reset()
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hash.Write(Km)
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Km = hash.Sum(Km[:0])
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return Ke, Km
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}
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// messageTag computes the MAC of a message (called the tag) as per
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@@ -209,7 +191,6 @@ func generateIV(params *ECIESParams, rand io.Reader) (iv []byte, err error) {
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}
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// symEncrypt carries out CTR encryption using the block cipher specified in the
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// parameters.
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func symEncrypt(rand io.Reader, params *ECIESParams, key, m []byte) (ct []byte, err error) {
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c, err := params.Cipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -249,36 +230,27 @@ func symDecrypt(params *ECIESParams, key, ct []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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// ciphertext. s1 is fed into key derivation, s2 is fed into the MAC. If the
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// shared information parameters aren't being used, they should be nil.
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func Encrypt(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, m, s1, s2 []byte) (ct []byte, err error) {
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params := pub.Params
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if params == nil {
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if params = ParamsFromCurve(pub.Curve); params == nil {
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err = ErrUnsupportedECIESParameters
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return
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}
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params, err := pubkeyParams(pub)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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R, err := GenerateKey(rand, pub.Curve, params)
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if err != nil {
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return
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return nil, err
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}
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z, err := R.GenerateShared(pub, params.KeyLen, params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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hash := params.Hash()
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z, err := R.GenerateShared(pub, params.KeyLen, params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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K, err := concatKDF(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen+params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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Ke := K[:params.KeyLen]
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Km := K[params.KeyLen:]
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hash.Write(Km)
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Km = hash.Sum(nil)
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hash.Reset()
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Ke, Km := deriveKeys(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen)
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em, err := symEncrypt(rand, params, Ke, m)
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if err != nil || len(em) <= params.BlockSize {
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return
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return nil, err
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}
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d := messageTag(params.Hash, Km, em, s2)
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@@ -288,7 +260,7 @@ func Encrypt(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, m, s1, s2 []byte) (ct []byte, err e
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copy(ct, Rb)
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copy(ct[len(Rb):], em)
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copy(ct[len(Rb)+len(em):], d)
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return
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return ct, nil
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}
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// Decrypt decrypts an ECIES ciphertext.
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@@ -296,13 +268,11 @@ func (prv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(c, s1, s2 []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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if len(c) == 0 {
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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params := prv.PublicKey.Params
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if params == nil {
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if params = ParamsFromCurve(prv.PublicKey.Curve); params == nil {
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err = ErrUnsupportedECIESParameters
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return
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}
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params, err := pubkeyParams(&prv.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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hash := params.Hash()
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var (
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@@ -316,12 +286,10 @@ func (prv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(c, s1, s2 []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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case 2, 3, 4:
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rLen = (prv.PublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 4
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if len(c) < (rLen + hLen + 1) {
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err = ErrInvalidMessage
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return
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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default:
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err = ErrInvalidPublicKey
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return
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return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
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}
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mStart = rLen
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@@ -331,36 +299,19 @@ func (prv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(c, s1, s2 []byte) (m []byte, err error) {
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R.Curve = prv.PublicKey.Curve
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R.X, R.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(R.Curve, c[:rLen])
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if R.X == nil {
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err = ErrInvalidPublicKey
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return
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}
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if !R.Curve.IsOnCurve(R.X, R.Y) {
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err = ErrInvalidCurve
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return
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return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
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}
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z, err := prv.GenerateShared(R, params.KeyLen, params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return
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return nil, err
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}
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K, err := concatKDF(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen+params.KeyLen)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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Ke := K[:params.KeyLen]
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Km := K[params.KeyLen:]
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hash.Write(Km)
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Km = hash.Sum(nil)
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hash.Reset()
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Ke, Km := deriveKeys(hash, z, s1, params.KeyLen)
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d := messageTag(params.Hash, Km, c[mStart:mEnd], s2)
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c[mEnd:], d) != 1 {
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err = ErrInvalidMessage
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return
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return nil, ErrInvalidMessage
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}
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m, err = symDecrypt(params, Ke, c[mStart:mEnd])
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return
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return symDecrypt(params, Ke, c[mStart:mEnd])
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}
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