rpc: dns rebind protection (#15962)

* cmd,node,rpc: add allowedHosts to prevent dns rebinding attacks

* p2p,node: Fix bug with dumpconfig introduced in r54aeb8e4c0bb9f0e7a6c67258af67df3b266af3d

* rpc: add wildcard support for rpcallowedhosts + go fmt

* cmd/geth, cmd/utils, node, rpc: ignore direct ip(v4/6) addresses in rpc virtual hostnames check

* http, rpc, utils: make vhosts into map, address review concerns

* node: change log messages to use geth standard (not sprintf)

* rpc: fix spelling
This commit is contained in:
Martin Holst Swende
2018-02-12 13:52:07 +01:00
committed by Péter Szilágyi
parent 9123eceb0f
commit 589b603a9b
8 changed files with 98 additions and 22 deletions

View File

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/rs/cors"
"strings"
)
const (
@ -148,8 +149,11 @@ func (t *httpReadWriteNopCloser) Close() error {
// NewHTTPServer creates a new HTTP RPC server around an API provider.
//
// Deprecated: Server implements http.Handler
func NewHTTPServer(cors []string, srv *Server) *http.Server {
return &http.Server{Handler: newCorsHandler(srv, cors)}
func NewHTTPServer(cors []string, vhosts []string, srv *Server) *http.Server {
// Wrap the CORS-handler within a host-handler
handler := newCorsHandler(srv, cors)
handler = newVHostHandler(vhosts, handler)
return &http.Server{Handler: handler}
}
// ServeHTTP serves JSON-RPC requests over HTTP.
@ -195,7 +199,6 @@ func newCorsHandler(srv *Server, allowedOrigins []string) http.Handler {
if len(allowedOrigins) == 0 {
return srv
}
c := cors.New(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
AllowedMethods: []string{http.MethodPost, http.MethodGet},
@ -204,3 +207,51 @@ func newCorsHandler(srv *Server, allowedOrigins []string) http.Handler {
})
return c.Handler(srv)
}
// virtualHostHandler is a handler which validates the Host-header of incoming requests.
// The virtualHostHandler can prevent DNS rebinding attacks, which do not utilize CORS-headers,
// since they do in-domain requests against the RPC api. Instead, we can see on the Host-header
// which domain was used, and validate that against a whitelist.
type virtualHostHandler struct {
vhosts map[string]struct{}
next http.Handler
}
// ServeHTTP serves JSON-RPC requests over HTTP, implements http.Handler
func (h *virtualHostHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// if r.Host is not set, we can continue serving since a browser would set the Host header
if r.Host == "" {
h.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.Host)
if err != nil {
// Either invalid (too many colons) or no port specified
host = r.Host
}
if ipAddr := net.ParseIP(host); ipAddr != nil {
// It's an IP address, we can serve that
h.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Not an ip address, but a hostname. Need to validate
if _, exist := h.vhosts["*"]; exist {
h.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
if _, exist := h.vhosts[host]; exist {
h.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
http.Error(w, "invalid host specified", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
func newVHostHandler(vhosts []string, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
vhostMap := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, allowedHost := range vhosts {
vhostMap[strings.ToLower(allowedHost)] = struct{}{}
}
return &virtualHostHandler{vhostMap, next}
}