eth/downloader: circumvent a fake blockchain attack

This commit is contained in:
Péter Szilágyi
2015-05-15 14:48:57 +03:00
parent b517967f86
commit 5c1a7b965c
2 changed files with 58 additions and 27 deletions

View File

@ -23,25 +23,26 @@ func createHashes(start, amount int) (hashes []common.Hash) {
for i := range hashes[:len(hashes)-1] {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hashes[i][:8], uint64(i+2))
}
return
}
func createBlock(i int, prevHash, hash common.Hash) *types.Block {
func createBlock(i int, parent, hash common.Hash) *types.Block {
header := &types.Header{Number: big.NewInt(int64(i))}
block := types.NewBlockWithHeader(header)
block.HeaderHash = hash
block.ParentHeaderHash = prevHash
block.ParentHeaderHash = parent
return block
}
func createBlocksFromHashes(hashes []common.Hash) map[common.Hash]*types.Block {
blocks := make(map[common.Hash]*types.Block)
for i, hash := range hashes {
blocks[hash] = createBlock(len(hashes)-i, knownHash, hash)
for i := 0; i < len(hashes); i++ {
parent := knownHash
if i < len(hashes)-1 {
parent = hashes[i+1]
}
blocks[hashes[i]] = createBlock(len(hashes)-i, parent, hashes[i])
}
return blocks
}
@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ func (dl *downloadTester) getHashes(head common.Hash) error {
hashes := make([]common.Hash, 0, maxHashFetch)
for i, hash := range dl.hashes {
if hash == head {
i++
for len(hashes) < cap(hashes) && i < len(dl.hashes) {
hashes = append(hashes, dl.hashes[i])
i++
@ -144,9 +146,11 @@ func (dl *downloadTester) getHashes(head common.Hash) error {
}
}
// Delay delivery a bit to allow attacks to unfold
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
dl.downloader.DeliverHashes(dl.activePeerId, hashes)
id := dl.activePeerId
go func() {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
dl.downloader.DeliverHashes(id, hashes)
}()
return nil
}
@ -424,12 +428,15 @@ func TestInvalidHashOrderAttack(t *testing.T) {
hashes := createHashes(0, 4*blockCacheLimit)
blocks := createBlocksFromHashes(hashes)
chunk1 := make([]common.Hash, blockCacheLimit)
chunk2 := make([]common.Hash, blockCacheLimit)
copy(chunk1, hashes[blockCacheLimit:2*blockCacheLimit])
copy(chunk2, hashes[2*blockCacheLimit:3*blockCacheLimit])
reverse := make([]common.Hash, len(hashes))
copy(reverse, hashes)
for i := len(hashes) / 4; i < 2*len(hashes)/4; i++ {
reverse[i], reverse[len(hashes)-i-1] = reverse[len(hashes)-i-1], reverse[i]
}
copy(reverse[2*blockCacheLimit:], chunk1)
copy(reverse[blockCacheLimit:], chunk2)
// Try and sync with the malicious node and check that it fails
tester := newTester(t, reverse, blocks)
@ -453,7 +460,6 @@ func TestMadeupHashChainAttack(t *testing.T) {
// Create a long chain of hashes without backing blocks
hashes := createHashes(0, 1024*blockCacheLimit)
hashes = hashes[:len(hashes)-1]
// Try and sync with the malicious node and check that it fails
tester := newTester(t, hashes, nil)
@ -462,3 +468,31 @@ func TestMadeupHashChainAttack(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("synchronisation error mismatch: have %v, want %v", err, ErrCrossCheckFailed)
}
}
// Tests that if a malicious peer makes up a random block chain, and tried to
// push indefinitely, it actually gets caught with it.
func TestMadeupBlockChainAttack(t *testing.T) {
blockTTL = 100 * time.Millisecond
crossCheckCycle = 25 * time.Millisecond
// Create a long chain of blocks and simulate an invalid chain by dropping every second
hashes := createHashes(0, 32*blockCacheLimit)
blocks := createBlocksFromHashes(hashes)
gapped := make([]common.Hash, len(hashes)/2)
for i := 0; i < len(gapped); i++ {
gapped[i] = hashes[2*i]
}
// Try and sync with the malicious node and check that it fails
tester := newTester(t, gapped, blocks)
tester.newPeer("attack", big.NewInt(10000), gapped[0])
if _, err := tester.syncTake("attack", gapped[0]); err != ErrCrossCheckFailed {
t.Fatalf("synchronisation error mismatch: have %v, want %v", err, ErrCrossCheckFailed)
}
// Ensure that a valid chain can still pass sync
tester.hashes = hashes
tester.newPeer("valid", big.NewInt(20000), hashes[0])
if _, err := tester.syncTake("valid", hashes[0]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to synchronise blocks: %v", err)
}
}