internal/ethapi: add personal_sign and fix eth_sign to hash message (#2940)

This commit includes several API changes:

- The behavior of eth_sign is changed. It now accepts an arbitrary
  message, prepends the well-known string

        \x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n<length of message>

  hashes the result using keccak256 and calculates the signature of
  the hash. This breaks backwards compatability!
  
- personal_sign(hash, address [, password]) is added. It has the same
  semantics as eth_sign but also accepts a password. The private key
  used to sign the hash is temporarily unlocked in the scope of the
  request.
  
- personal_recover(message, signature) is added and returns the
  address for the account that created a signature.
This commit is contained in:
bas-vk
2016-10-28 21:25:49 +02:00
committed by Felix Lange
parent 289b30715d
commit b59c8399fb
13 changed files with 221 additions and 35 deletions

View File

@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ func Ripemd160(data []byte) []byte {
return ripemd.Sum(nil)
}
// Ecrecover returns the public key for the private key that was used to
// calculate the signature.
//
// Note: secp256k1 expects the recover id to be either 0, 1. Ethereum
// signatures have a recover id with an offset of 27. Callers must take
// this into account and if "recovering" from an Ethereum signature adjust.
func Ecrecover(hash, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(hash, sig)
}
@ -192,17 +198,40 @@ func SigToPub(hash, sig []byte) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
return &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: secp256k1.S256(), X: x, Y: y}, nil
}
func Sign(hash []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (sig []byte, err error) {
if len(hash) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hash is required to be exactly 32 bytes (%d)", len(hash))
// Sign calculates an ECDSA signature.
// This function is susceptible to choosen plaintext attacks that can leak
// information about the private key that is used for signing. Callers must
// be aware that the given hash cannot be choosen by an adversery. Common
// solution is to hash any input before calculating the signature.
//
// Note: the calculated signature is not Ethereum compliant. The yellow paper
// dictates Ethereum singature to have a V value with and offset of 27 v in [27,28].
// Use SignEthereum to get an Ethereum compliant signature.
func Sign(data []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (sig []byte, err error) {
if len(data) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hash is required to be exactly 32 bytes (%d)", len(data))
}
seckey := common.LeftPadBytes(prv.D.Bytes(), prv.Params().BitSize/8)
defer zeroBytes(seckey)
sig, err = secp256k1.Sign(hash, seckey)
sig, err = secp256k1.Sign(data, seckey)
return
}
// SignEthereum calculates an Ethereum ECDSA signature.
// This function is susceptible to choosen plaintext attacks that can leak
// information about the private key that is used for signing. Callers must
// be aware that the given hash cannot be freely choosen by an adversery.
// Common solution is to hash the message before calculating the signature.
func SignEthereum(data []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := Sign(data, prv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sig[64] += 27 // as described in the yellow paper
return sig, err
}
func Encrypt(pub *ecdsa.PublicKey, message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(pub), message, nil, nil)
}