313 lines
		
	
	
		
			10 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			313 lines
		
	
	
		
			10 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // Copyright 2018 The go-ethereum Authors
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| // This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
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| //
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| // The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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| // it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
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| // the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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| // (at your option) any later version.
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| //
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| // The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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| // but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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| // MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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| // GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
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| //
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| // You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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| // along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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| 
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| package feed
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| 
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| import (
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| 	"bytes"
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| 	"encoding/binary"
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| 	"encoding/json"
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| 	"fmt"
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| 	"reflect"
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| 	"testing"
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| 
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| 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
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| 	"github.com/ethersphere/swarm/storage"
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| 	"github.com/ethersphere/swarm/storage/feed/lookup"
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| )
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| 
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| func areEqualJSON(s1, s2 string) (bool, error) {
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| 	//credit for the trick: turtlemonvh https://gist.github.com/turtlemonvh/e4f7404e28387fadb8ad275a99596f67
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| 	var o1 interface{}
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| 	var o2 interface{}
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| 
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| 	err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s1), &o1)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 1 :: %s", err.Error())
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| 	}
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| 	err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(s2), &o2)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 2 :: %s", err.Error())
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	return reflect.DeepEqual(o1, o2), nil
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| }
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| 
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| // TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests ensures that requests are serialized properly
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| // while also checking cryptographically that only the owner of a feed can update it.
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| func TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests(t *testing.T) {
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| 
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| 	charlie := newCharlieSigner() //Charlie
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| 	bob := newBobSigner()         //Bob
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| 
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| 	// Create a feed to our good guy Charlie's name
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| 	topic, _ := NewTopic("a good topic name", nil)
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| 	firstRequest := NewFirstRequest(topic)
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| 	firstRequest.User = charlie.Address()
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| 
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| 	// We now encode the create message to simulate we send it over the wire
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| 	messageRawData, err := firstRequest.MarshalJSON()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error encoding first feed update request: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// ... the message arrives and is decoded...
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| 	var recoveredFirstRequest Request
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| 	if err := recoveredFirstRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error decoding first feed update request: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// ... but verification should fail because it is not signed!
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| 	if err := recoveredFirstRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail since the message is not signed")
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// We now assume that the feed ypdate was created and propagated.
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| 
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| 	const expectedSignature = "0x7235b27a68372ddebcf78eba48543fa460864b0b0e99cb533fcd3664820e603312d29426dd00fb39628f5299480a69bf6e462838d78de49ce0704c754c9deb2601"
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| 	const expectedJSON = `{"feed":{"topic":"0x6120676f6f6420746f706963206e616d65000000000000000000000000000000","user":"0x876a8936a7cd0b79ef0735ad0896c1afe278781c"},"epoch":{"time":1000,"level":1},"protocolVersion":0,"data":"0x5468697320686f75722773207570646174653a20537761726d2039392e3020686173206265656e2072656c656173656421"}`
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| 
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| 	//Put together an unsigned update request that we will serialize to send it to the signer.
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| 	data := []byte("This hour's update: Swarm 99.0 has been released!")
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| 	request := &Request{
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| 		Update: Update{
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| 			ID: ID{
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| 				Epoch: lookup.Epoch{
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| 					Time:  1000,
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| 					Level: 1,
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| 				},
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| 				Feed: firstRequest.Update.Feed,
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| 			},
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| 			data: data,
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| 		},
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error encoding update request: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	equalJSON, err := areEqualJSON(string(messageRawData), expectedJSON)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request JSON: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 	if !equalJSON {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Received a different JSON message. Expected %s, got %s", expectedJSON, string(messageRawData))
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// now the encoded message messageRawData is sent over the wire and arrives to the signer
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| 
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| 	//Attempt to extract an UpdateRequest out of the encoded message
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| 	var recoveredRequest Request
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| 	if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	//sign the request and see if it matches our predefined signature above.
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| 	if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(charlie); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error signing request: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	compareByteSliceToExpectedHex(t, "signature", recoveredRequest.Signature[:], expectedSignature)
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| 
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| 	// mess with the signature and see what happens. To alter the signature, we briefly decode it as JSON
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| 	// to alter the signature field.
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| 	var j updateRequestJSON
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| 	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(expectedJSON), &j); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("Error unmarshalling test json, check expectedJSON constant")
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| 	}
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| 	j.Signature = "Certainly not a signature"
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| 	corruptMessage, _ := json.Marshal(j) // encode the message with the bad signature
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| 	var corruptRequest Request
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| 	if err = corruptRequest.UnmarshalJSON(corruptMessage); err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("Expected DecodeUpdateRequest to fail when trying to interpret a corrupt message with an invalid signature")
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Now imagine Bob wants to create an update of his own about the same feed,
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| 	// signing a message with his private key
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| 	if err := request.Sign(bob); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error signing: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Now Bob encodes the message to send it over the wire...
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| 	messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error encoding message:%s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// ... the message arrives to our Swarm node and it is decoded.
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| 	recoveredRequest = Request{}
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| 	if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error decoding message:%s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Before checking what happened with Bob's update, let's see what would happen if we mess
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| 	// with the signature big time to see if Verify catches it
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| 	savedSignature := *recoveredRequest.Signature                               // save the signature for later
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| 	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(recoveredRequest.Signature[5:], 556845463424) // write some random data to break the signature
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| 	if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail on corrupt signature")
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// restore the Bob's signature from corruption
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| 	*recoveredRequest.Signature = savedSignature
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| 
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| 	// Now the signature is not corrupt
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| 	if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Reuse object and sign with our friend Charlie's private key
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| 	if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(charlie); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error signing with the correct private key: %s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// And now, Verify should work since this update now belongs to Charlie
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| 	if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Error verifying that Charlie, can sign a reused request object:%s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// mess with the lookup key to make sure Verify fails:
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| 	recoveredRequest.Time = 77999 // this will alter the lookup key
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| 	if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Expected Verify to fail since the lookup key has been altered")
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| func getTestRequest() *Request {
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| 	return &Request{
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| 		Update: *getTestFeedUpdate(),
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| func TestUpdateChunkSerializationErrorChecking(t *testing.T) {
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| 
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| 	// Test that parseUpdate fails if the chunk is too small
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| 	var r Request
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| 	if err := r.fromChunk(storage.NewChunk(storage.ZeroAddr, make([]byte, minimumUpdateDataLength-1+signatureLength))); err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Expected request.fromChunk to fail when chunkData contains less than %d bytes", minimumUpdateDataLength)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	r = *getTestRequest()
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| 
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| 	_, err := r.toChunk()
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| 	if err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("Expected request.toChunk to fail when there is no data")
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| 	}
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| 	r.data = []byte("Al bien hacer jamás le falta premio") // put some arbitrary length data
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| 	_, err = r.toChunk()
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| 	if err == nil {
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| 		t.Fatal("expected request.toChunk to fail when there is no signature")
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	charlie := newCharlieSigner()
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| 	if err := r.Sign(charlie); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("error signing:%s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	chunk, err := r.toChunk()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("error creating update chunk:%s", err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	compareByteSliceToExpectedHex(t, "chunk", chunk.Data(), "0x0000000000000000776f726c64206e657773207265706f72742c20657665727920686f7572000000876a8936a7cd0b79ef0735ad0896c1afe278781ce80300000000001f416c206269656e206861636572206a616dc3a173206c652066616c7461207072656d696f9896df5937e64e51a7994479ff3fe0ed790d539b9b3e85e93c0014a8a64374f23603c79d16e99b50a757896d3816d7022ac594ad1415679a9b164afb2e5926d801")
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| 
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| 	var recovered Request
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| 	recovered.fromChunk(chunk)
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| 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(recovered, r) {
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| 		t.Fatal("Expected recovered feed update request to equal the original one")
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| // check that signature address matches update signer address
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| func TestReverse(t *testing.T) {
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| 
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| 	epoch := lookup.Epoch{
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| 		Time:  7888,
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| 		Level: 6,
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// make fake timeProvider
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| 	timeProvider := &fakeTimeProvider{
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| 		currentTime: startTime.Time,
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// signer containing private key
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| 	signer := newAliceSigner()
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| 
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| 	// set up rpc and create feeds handler
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| 	_, _, teardownTest, err := setupTest(timeProvider, signer)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 	defer teardownTest()
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| 
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| 	topic, _ := NewTopic("Cervantes quotes", nil)
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| 	fd := Feed{
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| 		Topic: topic,
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| 		User:  signer.Address(),
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	data := []byte("Donde una puerta se cierra, otra se abre")
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| 
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| 	request := new(Request)
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| 	request.Feed = fd
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| 	request.Epoch = epoch
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| 	request.data = data
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| 
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| 	// generate a chunk key for this request
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| 	key := request.Addr()
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| 
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| 	if err = request.Sign(signer); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	chunk, err := request.toChunk()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// check that we can recover the owner account from the update chunk's signature
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| 	var checkUpdate Request
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| 	if err := checkUpdate.fromChunk(chunk); err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 	checkdigest, err := checkUpdate.GetDigest()
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatal(err)
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| 	}
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| 	recoveredAddr, err := getUserAddr(checkdigest, *checkUpdate.Signature)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Retrieve address from signature fail: %v", err)
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| 	}
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| 	originalAddr := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(signer.PrivKey.PublicKey)
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| 
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| 	// check that the metadata retrieved from the chunk matches what we gave it
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| 	if recoveredAddr != originalAddr {
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| 		t.Fatalf("addresses dont match: %x != %x", originalAddr, recoveredAddr)
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	if !bytes.Equal(key[:], chunk.Address()[:]) {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Expected chunk key '%x', was '%x'", key, chunk.Address())
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| 	}
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| 	if epoch != checkUpdate.Epoch {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Expected epoch to be '%s', was '%s'", epoch.String(), checkUpdate.Epoch.String())
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| 	}
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| 	if !bytes.Equal(data, checkUpdate.data) {
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| 		t.Fatalf("Expected data '%x', was '%x'", data, checkUpdate.data)
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| 	}
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| }
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