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Allow the same account to be passed multiple times to a single instruction (#7795)

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This commit is contained in:
Jack May
2020-01-22 09:11:56 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent d854e90c23
commit 023074650f
33 changed files with 1392 additions and 765 deletions
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33
programs/vest/src/vest_processor.rs
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@@ -12,12 +12,13 @@ use solana_sdk::{
instruction_processor_utils::{limited_deserialize, next_keyed_account},
pubkey::Pubkey,
};
use std::cell::RefMut;
fn verify_date_account(
keyed_account: &mut KeyedAccount,
expected_pubkey: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<Date<Utc>, InstructionError> {
if keyed_account.account.owner != solana_config_program::id() {
if keyed_account.owner()? != solana_config_program::id() {
return Err(InstructionError::IncorrectProgramId);
}
@@ -34,18 +35,18 @@ fn verify_date_account(
fn verify_account<'a>(
keyed_account: &'a mut KeyedAccount,
expected_pubkey: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<&'a mut Account, InstructionError> {
) -> Result<RefMut<'a, Account>, InstructionError> {
if keyed_account.unsigned_key() != expected_pubkey {
return Err(VestError::Unauthorized.into());
}
Ok(keyed_account.account)
keyed_account.try_account_ref_mut()
}
fn verify_signed_account<'a>(
keyed_account: &'a mut KeyedAccount,
expected_pubkey: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<&'a mut Account, InstructionError> {
) -> Result<RefMut<'a, Account>, InstructionError> {
if keyed_account.signer_key().is_none() {
return Err(InstructionError::MissingRequiredSignature);
}
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ pub fn process_instruction(
data: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), InstructionError> {
let keyed_accounts_iter = &mut keyed_accounts.iter_mut();
let contract_account = &mut next_keyed_account(keyed_accounts_iter)?.account;
let contract_account = &mut next_keyed_account(keyed_accounts_iter)?.try_account_ref_mut()?;
let instruction = limited_deserialize(data)?;
@@ -104,11 +105,11 @@ pub fn process_instruction(
next_keyed_account(keyed_accounts_iter)?,
&vest_state.date_pubkey,
)?;
let payee_account = verify_account(
let mut payee_account = verify_account(
next_keyed_account(keyed_accounts_iter)?,
&vest_state.payee_pubkey,
)?;
vest_state.redeem_tokens(contract_account, current_date, payee_account);
vest_state.redeem_tokens(contract_account, current_date, &mut payee_account);
}
VestInstruction::Terminate | VestInstruction::Renege(_) => {
let lamports = if let VestInstruction::Renege(lamports) = instruction {
@@ -121,12 +122,12 @@ pub fn process_instruction(
&vest_state.terminator_pubkey,
)?;
let payee_keyed_account = keyed_accounts_iter.next();
let payee_account = if let Some(payee_keyed_account) = payee_keyed_account {
&mut payee_keyed_account.account
let mut payee_account = if let Some(payee_keyed_account) = payee_keyed_account {
payee_keyed_account.try_account_ref_mut()?
} else {
terminator_account
};
vest_state.renege(contract_account, payee_account, lamports);
vest_state.renege(contract_account, &mut payee_account, lamports);
}
VestInstruction::VestAll => {
verify_signed_account(
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_account_unauthorized() {
// Ensure client can't sneak in with an untrusted date account.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id());
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id());
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account);
let mallory_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand(); // <-- Attack! Not the expected account.
@@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_signed_account_missing_signature() {
// Ensure client can't sneak in with an unsigned account.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id());
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id());
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account); // <-- Attack! Unsigned transaction.
assert_eq!(
@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_date_account_incorrect_program_id() {
// Ensure client can't sneak in with a non-Config account.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 0, &id()); // <-- Attack! Pass Vest account where Config account is expected.
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 0, &id()); // <-- Attack! Pass Vest account where Config account is expected.
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account);
assert_eq!(
verify_date_account(&mut keyed_account, &date_pubkey).unwrap_err(),
@@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_date_account_uninitialized_config() {
// Ensure no panic when `get_config_data()` returns an error.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id()); // <-- Attack! Zero space.
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 0, &solana_config_program::id()); // <-- Attack! Zero space.
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account);
assert_eq!(
verify_date_account(&mut keyed_account, &date_pubkey).unwrap_err(),
@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_date_account_invalid_date_config() {
// Ensure no panic when `deserialize::<DateConfig>()` returns an error.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 1, &solana_config_program::id()); // Attack! 1 byte, enough to sneak by `get_config_data()`, but not DateConfig deserialize.
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 1, &solana_config_program::id()); // Attack! 1 byte, enough to sneak by `get_config_data()`, but not DateConfig deserialize.
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account);
assert_eq!(
verify_date_account(&mut keyed_account, &date_pubkey).unwrap_err(),
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_verify_date_account_deserialize() {
// Ensure no panic when `deserialize::<DateConfig>()` returns an error.
let date_pubkey = Pubkey::new_rand();
let mut account = Account::new(1, 1, &solana_config_program::id()); // Attack! 1 byte, enough to sneak by `get_config_data()`, but not DateConfig deserialize.
let mut account = Account::new_ref(1, 1, &solana_config_program::id()); // Attack! 1 byte, enough to sneak by `get_config_data()`, but not DateConfig deserialize.
let mut keyed_account = KeyedAccount::new(&date_pubkey, false, &mut account);
assert_eq!(
verify_date_account(&mut keyed_account, &date_pubkey).unwrap_err(),