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Free up term "finality" to imply "economic finality" (#2002)

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* leader finality -> confirmation

Free up term "finality" to imply "economic finality."

* Reorder chapters
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Greg Fitzgerald
2018-12-04 20:52:38 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2112c87e13
commit 209040e80e
5 changed files with 23 additions and 22 deletions
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rfcs/0007-staking-rewards.md
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ To become a Solana validator, a network node must deposit/lock-up some amount of
- *Validation period*: a minimum duration for which the deposited SOL will be inaccessible, at risk of slashing (see slashing rules below) and earning network rewards for the validator participation. Likely duration of months to a year.
- *Cool-down period*: a duration of time following the submission of a 'withdrawal' transaction. During this period validation responsibilities have been removed and the funds continue to be inaccessible. Accumulated rewards should be delivered at the end of this period, along with the return of the initial deposit.
Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure, along with its [avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast and transmission design, should provide sub-second finality times that scale with the log of the number of nodes in the network. This means we shouldn't have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts of SOL staked. This should also render validation pools, a proposed solution for economic censorship imposed by minimum staking amounts currently described in Casper, unnecessary and remove the concern for needing to put slashable stake at risk while relying on others to play by the rules.
Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure, along with its [avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast and transmission design, should provide subsecond confirmation times that scale with the log of the number of nodes in the network. This means we shouldn't have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts of SOL staked. This should also render validation pools, a proposed solution for economic censorship imposed by minimum staking amounts currently described in Casper, unnecessary and remove the concern for needing to put slashable stake at risk while relying on others to play by the rules.
### Stake-weighted Rewards