tower consensus naming (#4598)

s/locktower/tower/g
This commit is contained in:
anatoly yakovenko
2019-06-24 13:41:23 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 407b1d3e6f
commit 29611fb61d
15 changed files with 152 additions and 159 deletions

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@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@
- [Blocktree](blocktree.md)
- [Cluster Software Installation and Updates](installer.md)
- [Deterministic Transaction Fees](transaction-fees.md)
- [Fork Selection](fork-selection.md)
- [Tower BFT](tower-bft.md)
- [Leader-to-Leader Transition](leader-leader-transition.md)
- [Leader-to-Validator Transition](leader-validator-transition.md)
- [Passive Stake Delegation and Rewards](passive-stake-delegation-and-rewards.md)
- [Persistent Account Storage](persistent-account-storage.md)
- [Reliable Vote Transmission](reliable-vote-transmission.md)
- [Repair Service](repair-service.md)
- [Testing Programs](testing-programs.md)
- [Testing Programs](testing-programs.md)

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ A validator votes on a PoH hash for two purposes. First, the vote indicates it
believes the ledger is valid up until that point in time. Second, since many
valid forks may exist at a given height, the vote also indicates exclusive
support for the fork. This document describes only the former. The latter is
described in [fork selection](fork-selection.md).
described in [Tower BFT](tower-bft.md).
## Current Design
@@ -50,12 +50,11 @@ log the time since the NewBlock transaction was submitted.
### Finality and Payouts
Locktower is the proposed [fork selection](fork-selection.md) algorithm. It
proposes that payment to miners be postponed until the *stack* of validator
votes reaches a certain depth, at which point rollback is not economically
feasible. The vote program may therefore implement locktower. Vote instructions
would need to reference a global locktower account so that it can track
cross-block state.
[Tower BFT](tower-bft.md) is the proposed fork selection algorithm. It proposes
that payment to miners be postponed until the *stack* of validator votes reaches
a certain depth, at which point rollback is not economically feasible. The vote
program may therefore implement Tower BFT. Vote instructions would need to
reference a global Tower account so that it can track cross-block state.
## Challenges

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@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Validators can ignore forks at other points (e.g. from the wrong leader), or
slash the leader responsible for the fork.
Validators vote based on a greedy choice to maximize their reward described in
[forks selection](fork-selection.md).
[Tower BFT](tower-bft.md).
### Validator's View

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@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ ends up scheduled for the first two epochs because the leader schedule is also
generated at slot 0 for the next epoch. The length of the first two epochs can
be specified in the genesis block as well. The minimum length of the first
epochs must be greater than or equal to the maximum rollback depth as defined in
[fork selection](fork-selection.md).
[Tower BFT](tower-bft.md).
## Leader Schedule Generation Algorithm

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@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The program should have a list of slots which are valid storage mining slots.
This list should be maintained by keeping track of slots which are rooted slots in which a significant
portion of the network has voted on with a high lockout value, maybe 32-votes old. Every SLOTS\_PER\_SEGMENT
number of slots would be added to this set. The program should check that the slot is in this set. The set can
be maintained by receiving a AdvertiseStorageRecentBlockHash and checking with its bank/locktower state.
be maintained by receiving a AdvertiseStorageRecentBlockHash and checking with its bank/Tower BFT state.
The program should do a signature verify check on the signature, public key from the transaction submitter and the message of
the previous storage epoch PoH value.

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@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ The read is satisfied by pointing to a memory-mapped location in the
## Root Forks
The [fork selection algorithm](fork-selection.md) eventually selects a fork as a
[Tower BFT](tower-bft.md) eventually selects a fork as a
root fork and the fork is squashed. A squashed/root fork cannot be rolled back.
When a fork is squashed, all accounts in its parents not already present in the

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@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ count as stakes.
### VoteInstruction::Vote(Vec<Vote>)
* `account[0]` - RW - The VoteState
`VoteState::lockouts` and `VoteState::credits` are updated according to voting lockout rules see [Fork Selection](fork-selection.md)
`VoteState::lockouts` and `VoteState::credits` are updated according to voting lockout rules see [Tower BFT](tower-bft.md)
* `account[1]` - RO - A list of some N most recent slots and their hashes for the vote to be verified against.

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Fork Selection
# Tower BFT
This design describes a *Fork Selection* algorithm. It addresses the following
problems:
This design describes Solana's *Tower BFT* algorithm. It addresses the
following problems:
* Some forks may not end up accepted by the super-majority of the cluster, and
voters need to recover from voting on such forks.