diff --git a/book/src/ed_economic_sustainability.md b/book/src/ed_economic_sustainability.md index fc580b385c..ca39bce735 100644 --- a/book/src/ed_economic_sustainability.md +++ b/book/src/ed_economic_sustainability.md @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ The Replicator rewards are to be delivered to replicators from the mining pool a In the example shown in Figure 1, multiple per PoRep base rewards are explored (as a % of Tx Fee) to be delivered when the global ledger replication redundancy meets 10X. When the global ledger replication redundancy is less than 10X, the base reward is discounted as a function of the square of the ratio of the actual ledger replication redundancy to the goal redundancy (i.e. 10X). -The other protocol-based remittance goes to validation-clients as a reward distributed in proportion to stake-weight for voting to validate the ledger state. The functional issuance of this reward is described in **Section 2.1 **and is designed to reduce over time until validators are incentivized solely through collection of transaction fees. Therefore, in the long-run, protocol-based rewards to replication-nodes will be the only remittances from the mining pool, and will have to be countered by the portion of each non-PoRep transaction fee that is directed back into the mining pool. I.e. for a long-term self-sustaining economy, replicator-client rewards must be subsidized through a minimum fee on each non-PoRep transaction pre-allocated to the mining pool. Through this constraint, we can write the following inequality: +The other protocol-based remittance goes to validation-clients as a reward distributed in proportion to stake-weight for voting to validate the ledger state. The functional issuance of this reward is described in [Section 2.1](ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md) and is designed to reduce over time until validators are incentivized solely through collection of transaction fees. Therefore, in the long-run, protocol-based rewards to replication-nodes will be the only remittances from the mining pool, and will have to be countered by the portion of each non-PoRep transaction fee that is directed back into the mining pool. I.e. for a long-term self-sustaining economy, replicator-client rewards must be subsidized through a minimum fee on each non-PoRep transaction pre-allocated to the mining pool. Through this constraint, we can write the following inequality: **== WIP [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HBDasdkjS4Ja9wC_tIUsZPVcxGAWTuYOq9zf6xoQNps/edit?usp=sharing) ==** - diff --git a/book/src/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md b/book/src/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md index 5e1065a965..817f4bee1a 100644 --- a/book/src/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md +++ b/book/src/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ ### 3.2 Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation -The ability for Solana network participant’s to earn rewards by providing storage service is a unique onboarding path that requires little hardware overhead and minimal upfront capital. It offers an avenue for individuals with extra-storage space on their home laptops or PCs to contribute to the security of the network and become integrated into the Solana economy. +The ability for Solana network participant’s to earn rewards by providing storage service is a unique on-boarding path that requires little hardware overhead and minimal upfront capital. It offers an avenue for individuals with extra-storage space on their home laptops or PCs to contribute to the security of the network and become integrated into the Solana economy. -To enhance this onboarding ramp and facilitate further participation and investment in the Solana economy, replication-clients have the opportunity to auto-delegate their rewards to validation-clients of their choice. Much like the automatic reinvestment of stock dividends, in this scenario, a replicator-client can earn Solana tokens by providing some storage capacity to the network (i.e. via submitting valid PoReps), have the protocol-based rewards automatically assigned as delegation to a staked validator node and therefore earning interest in the validation-client reward pool. +To enhance this on-boarding ramp and facilitate further participation and investment in the Solana economy, replication-clients have the opportunity to auto-delegate their rewards to validation-clients of their choice. Much like the automatic reinvestment of stock dividends, in this scenario, a replicator-client can earn Solana tokens by providing some storage capacity to the network (i.e. via submitting valid PoReps), have the protocol-based rewards automatically assigned as delegation to a staked validator node and therefore earning interest in the validation-client reward pool. diff --git a/book/src/ed_vcd_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md b/book/src/ed_vcd_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md index db43f59a8e..7cd9d1a55c 100644 --- a/book/src/ed_vcd_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md +++ b/book/src/ed_vcd_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md @@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ As previously mentioned, validator-clients will also be responsible for validati While replication-clients are incentivized and rewarded through protocol-based rewards schedule (see Section 3), validator-clients will be incentivized to include and validate PoReps in PoH through the distribution of the transaction fees associated with the submitted PoRep. As will be described in detail in the Section 3.1, replication-client rewards are protocol-based and designed to reward based on a global data redundancy factor. I.e. the protocol will incentivize replication-client participation through rewards based on a target ledger redundancy (e.g. 10x data redundancy). It was chosen not to include a distribution of these rewards to PoRep validators, and to rely only on the collection of PoRep attached transaction fees, due to the fact that the confluence of two participation incentive modes (state-validation inflation rate via global staked % and replication-validation rewards based on global redundancy factor) on the incentives of a single network participant (a validator-client) potentially opened up a significant incentive-driven attack surface area. -The validation of PoReps by validation-clients is computationally more expensive than state-validation (detail in **Section 4**), thus the transaction fees are expected to be proportionally higher. However, because replication-client rewards are distributed in proportion to and only after submitted PoReps are validated, they are uniquely motivated for the inclusion and validation of their proofs. This pressure is expected to generate an adequate market economy between replication-clients and validation-clients. Additionally, transaction fees submitted with PoReps have no minimum amount pre-allocated to the mining pool, as do state-validation transaction fees. +The validation of PoReps by validation-clients is computationally more expensive than state-validation (detail in [Section 4](ed_economic_sustainability.md)), thus the transaction fees are expected to be proportionally higher. However, because replication-client rewards are distributed in proportion to and only after submitted PoReps are validated, they are uniquely motivated for the inclusion and validation of their proofs. This pressure is expected to generate an adequate market economy between replication-clients and validation-clients. Additionally, transaction fees submitted with PoReps have no minimum amount pre-allocated to the mining pool, as do state-validation transaction fees. There are various attack vectors available for colluding validation and replication clients, as described in detail below in Section 4. To protect against various collusion attack vectors, for a given epoch, PoRep transaction fees are pooled, and redistributed across participating validation-clients in proportion to the number of validated PoReps in the epoch less the number of invalidated PoReps [DIAGRAM]. This design rewards validators proportional to the number of PoReps they process and validate, while providing negative pressure for validation-clients to submit lazy or malicious invalid votes on submitted PoReps (note that it is computationally prohibitive to determine whether a validator-client has marked a valid PoRep as invalid). diff --git a/book/src/ed_vcd_validation_stake_delegation.md b/book/src/ed_vcd_validation_stake_delegation.md index 56778be095..6dc6f5f9ec 100644 --- a/book/src/ed_vcd_validation_stake_delegation.md +++ b/book/src/ed_vcd_validation_stake_delegation.md @@ -2,81 +2,28 @@ Running a Solana validation-client required relatively modest upfront hardware capital investment. **Table 2** provides an example hardware configuration to support ~1M tx/s with estimated ‘off-the-shelf’ costs: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ComponentExampleEstimated Cost
GPU2x 2080 Ti$2500
or4x 1080 Ti$2800
OS/Ledger StorageSamsung 860 Evo 2TB$370
Accounts storage2x Samsung 970 Pro M.2 512GB$340
RAM32 Gb$300
MotherboardAMD x399$400
CPUAMD Threadripper 2920x$650
Case$100
Power supplyEVGA 1600W$300
Network> 500 mbps
Network (1)Google webpass business bay area 1gbps unlimited$5500/mo
Network (2)Hurricane Electric bay area colo 1gbps$500/mo
- +|Component|Example|Estimated Cost| +|--- |--- |--- | +|GPU|2x 2080 Ti|$2500| +|or|4x 1080 Ti|$2800| +|OS/Ledger Storage|Samsung 860 Evo 2TB|$370| +|Accounts storage|2x Samsung 970 Pro M.2 512GB|$340| +|RAM|32 Gb|$300| +|Motherboard|AMD x399|$400| +|CPU|AMD Threadripper 2920x|$650| +|Case||$100| +|Power supply|EVGA 1600W|$300| +|Network|> 500 mbps|| +|Network (1)|Google webpass business bay area 1gbps unlimited|$5500/mo| +|Network (2)|Hurricane Electric bay area colo 1gbps|$500/mo| +**Table 2** example high-end hardware setup for running a Solana client. Despite the low-barrier to entry as a validation-client, from a capital investment perspective, as in any developing economy, there will be much opportunity and need for trusted validation services as evidenced by node reliability, UX/UI, APIs and other software accessibility tools. Additionally, although Solana’s validator node startup costs are nominal when compared to similar networks, they may still be somewhat restrictive for some potential participants. In the spirit of developing a true decentralized, permissionless network, these interested parties still have two options to become involved in the Solana network/economy: 1. Delegation of previously acquired tokens with a reliable validation node to earn a portion of interest generated -2. Provide local storage space as a replication-client and receive rewards by submitting Proof-of-Replication (see **Section 3**). +2. Provide local storage space as a replication-client and receive rewards by submitting Proof-of-Replication (see [Section 3](ed_replication_client_economics.md)). - 1. This participant has the additional option to directly delegate their earned storage rewards (**Section 3.2**) + a. This participant has the additional option to directly delegate their earned storage rewards ([Section 3.2](ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md)) Delegation of tokens to validation-clients, via option 1, provides a way for passive Solana token holders to become part of the active Solana economy and earn interest rates proportional to the interest rate generated by the delegated validation-client. Additionally, this feature creates a healthy validation-client market, with potential validation-client nodes competing to build reliable, transparent and profitable delegation services.