Refactor file and URL paths in docusaurus (#11080)

* Fix introduction link

* Restore staking guide pages

* Remove Edit this page link

* Fix broken wallet guide link

* Restore lost images

* Fixup URL paths to match gitbook style

* Refactor wallet guide READMEs and clean up URLs

* Remove lingering gitbook files

* Refactor all README files to keep consistent linking

* Updte homepage tile links

Co-authored-by: publish-docs.sh <maintainers@solana.com>

docs/src/implemented-proposals/README.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Implemented Design Proposals
----
-
-The following design proposals are fully implemented.

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_cluster_economics.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ These protocol-based rewards, to be distributed to participating validation clie
 
 Transaction fees are market-based participant-to-participant transfers, attached to network interactions as a necessary motivation and compensation for the inclusion and execution of a proposed transaction. A mechanism for long-term economic stability and forking protection through partial burning of each transaction fee is also discussed below.
 
-A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics/README.md), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the section titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunities and marketplace. Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rent_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger. An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section.
+A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_overview.md), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the section titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunities and marketplace. Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rent_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger. An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section.
 
 ![](/img/economic_design_infl_230719.png)
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Validator-client rewards for these services are to be distributed at the end of
 
 The effective protocol-based annual interest rate \(%\) per epoch received by validation-clients is to be a function of:
 
-- the current global inflation rate, derived from the pre-determined dis-inflationary issuance schedule \(see [Validation-client Economics](README.md)\)
+- the current global inflation rate, derived from the pre-determined dis-inflationary issuance schedule \(see [Validation-client Economics](ed_vce_overview.md)\)
 - the fraction of staked SOLs out of the current total circulating supply,
 - the up-time/participation \[% of available slots that validator had opportunity to vote on\] of a given validator over the previous epoch.
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/staking-rewards.md

@@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure
 
 ## Penalties
 
-As discussed in the [Economic Design](../implemented-proposals/ed_overview/README.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their _validation period_. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
+As discussed in the [Economic Design](ed_overview/ed_cluster_economics.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their _validation period_. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
 
 Similarly, we may consider an algorithmic reduction in a validator's active amount staked amount in the case that they are offline. I.e. if a validator is inactive for some amount of time, either due to a partition or otherwise, the amount of their stake that is considered ‘active’ \(eligible to earn rewards\) may be reduced. This design would be structured to help long-lived partitions to eventually reach finality on their respective chains as the % of non-voting total stake is reduced over time until a supermajority can be achieved by the active validators in each partition. Similarly, upon re-engaging, the ‘active’ amount staked will come back online at some defined rate. Different rates of stake reduction may be considered depending on the size of the partition/active set.