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Fix links in docs (#9119)

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Greg Fitzgerald
2020-03-27 09:36:55 -06:00
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docs/src/implemented-proposals/staking-rewards.md
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure
## Penalties
As discussed in the [Economic Design](../implemented-proposals/ed_overview/) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their _validation period_. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
As discussed in the [Economic Design](../implemented-proposals/ed_overview/README.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their _validation period_. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
Similarly, we may consider an algorithmic reduction in a validator's active amount staked amount in the case that they are offline. I.e. if a validator is inactive for some amount of time, either due to a partition or otherwise, the amount of their stake that is considered ‘active’ \(eligible to earn rewards\) may be reduced. This design would be structured to help long-lived partitions to eventually reach finality on their respective chains as the % of non-voting total stake is reduced over time until a supermajority can be achieved by the active validators in each partition. Similarly, upon re-engaging, the ‘active’ amount staked will come back online at some defined rate. Different rates of stake reduction may be considered depending on the size of the partition/active set.