From f2ab8f17c8410b3791ed756e0f2ecc177b6cdb43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 12:28:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] udpate staking section --- book/src/staking-rewards.md | 42 +++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/book/src/staking-rewards.md b/book/src/staking-rewards.md index b64fa9a4bd..404b10ad77 100644 --- a/book/src/staking-rewards.md +++ b/book/src/staking-rewards.md @@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ specific attributes to be modified as is allowed by Solana's Proof of History ### General Overview -Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted -randomly selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data +Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data structure to validating nodes. These nodes, upon receiving the leader's broadcast, have the opportunity to vote on the current state and PoH height by signing a transaction into the PoH stream. @@ -50,43 +49,12 @@ specific parameters will be necessary: Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure, along with its [avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast -and transmission design, should provide subsecond confirmation times that scale +and transmission design, should provide sub-second transaction confirmation times that scale with the log of the number of nodes in the cluster. This means we shouldn't have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts -of SOL staked. This should also render validation pools, a proposed solution -for economic censorship imposed by minimum staking amounts currently described -in Casper, unnecessary and remove the concern for needing to put slashable -stake at risk while relying on others to play by the rules. +of SOL staked. At the same time, Solana's focus on high-throughput should create incentive for validation clients to provide high-performant and reliable hardware. Combined with potential a minimum network speed threshold to join as a validation-client, we expect a healthy validation delegation market to emerge. To this end, Solana's testnet will lead into a "Tour de SOL" validation-client competition, focusing on throughput and uptime to rank and reward testnet validators. -### Stake-weighted Rewards - -Rewards are expected to be paid out to active validators as a function of -validator activity and as a proportion of the percentage of SOL they have at -stake out of the entirety of the staking pool. - -We expect to define a baseline annual validator payout/inflation rate based on -the total SOL deposited. E.g. 10% annual interest on SOL deposited with X total -SOL deposited as slashable on the cluster. This is the same design as currently -proposed in Casper FFG which has additionally specifies how inflation rates -adjust as a function of total ETH deposited. Specifically, Casper validator -returns are proportional to the inverse square root of the total deposits and -initial annual rates are estimated as: - -| Deposit Size | Annual Validator Interest | -|-------------:|--------------------------:| -| 2.5M ETH | 10.12% | -| 10M ETH | 5.00% | -| 20M ETH | 3.52% | -| 40M ETH | 2.48% | - -This has the nice property of potentially incentivizing participation around a -target deposit size. Incentivisation of specific participation rates more -directly (rather than deposit size) may something also worth exploring. - -The specifics of the Solana validator reward scheme are to be worked out in -parallel with a design for transaction fee assignment as well as our storage -mining reward scheme. ### Slashing rules @@ -149,8 +117,8 @@ This is an area currently under exploration ### Penalties -As previously discussed, annual validator reward rates are to be specified as a -function of total amount staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online +As discussed in the [Economic Design](ed_overview.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a +function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their *validation period*. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.