udpate staking section
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@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ specific attributes to be modified as is allowed by Solana's Proof of History
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### General Overview
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### General Overview
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Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted
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Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data
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randomly selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data
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structure to validating nodes. These nodes, upon receiving the leader's
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structure to validating nodes. These nodes, upon receiving the leader's
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broadcast, have the opportunity to vote on the current state and PoH height by
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broadcast, have the opportunity to vote on the current state and PoH height by
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signing a transaction into the PoH stream.
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signing a transaction into the PoH stream.
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@ -50,43 +49,12 @@ specific parameters will be necessary:
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Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data
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Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data
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structure, along with its
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structure, along with its
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[avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast
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[avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast
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and transmission design, should provide subsecond confirmation times that scale
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and transmission design, should provide sub-second transaction confirmation times that scale
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with the log of the number of nodes in the cluster. This means we shouldn't
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with the log of the number of nodes in the cluster. This means we shouldn't
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have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum
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have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum
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deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts
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deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts
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of SOL staked. This should also render validation pools, a proposed solution
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of SOL staked. At the same time, Solana's focus on high-throughput should create incentive for validation clients to provide high-performant and reliable hardware. Combined with potential a minimum network speed threshold to join as a validation-client, we expect a healthy validation delegation market to emerge. To this end, Solana's testnet will lead into a "Tour de SOL" validation-client competition, focusing on throughput and uptime to rank and reward testnet validators.
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for economic censorship imposed by minimum staking amounts currently described
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in Casper, unnecessary and remove the concern for needing to put slashable
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stake at risk while relying on others to play by the rules.
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### Stake-weighted Rewards
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Rewards are expected to be paid out to active validators as a function of
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validator activity and as a proportion of the percentage of SOL they have at
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stake out of the entirety of the staking pool.
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We expect to define a baseline annual validator payout/inflation rate based on
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the total SOL deposited. E.g. 10% annual interest on SOL deposited with X total
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SOL deposited as slashable on the cluster. This is the same design as currently
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proposed in Casper FFG which has additionally specifies how inflation rates
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adjust as a function of total ETH deposited. Specifically, Casper validator
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returns are proportional to the inverse square root of the total deposits and
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initial annual rates are estimated as:
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| Deposit Size | Annual Validator Interest |
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|-------------:|--------------------------:|
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| 2.5M ETH | 10.12% |
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| 10M ETH | 5.00% |
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| 20M ETH | 3.52% |
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| 40M ETH | 2.48% |
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This has the nice property of potentially incentivizing participation around a
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target deposit size. Incentivisation of specific participation rates more
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directly (rather than deposit size) may something also worth exploring.
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The specifics of the Solana validator reward scheme are to be worked out in
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parallel with a design for transaction fee assignment as well as our storage
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mining reward scheme.
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### Slashing rules
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### Slashing rules
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@ -149,8 +117,8 @@ This is an area currently under exploration
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### Penalties
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### Penalties
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As previously discussed, annual validator reward rates are to be specified as a
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As discussed in the [Economic Design](ed_overview.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a
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function of total amount staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online
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function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online
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and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of
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and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of
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their *validation period*. For validators that go offline/fail to validate
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their *validation period*. For validators that go offline/fail to validate
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transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
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transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
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