ffeac298a2
* fix: ignore unknown fields in more RPC responses * Remove mdbook infrastructure * Delete gitattributes and other theme related items Move all docs to /docs folder to support Docusaurus * all docs need to be moved to /docs * can be changed in the future Add Docusaurus infrastructure * initialize docusaurus repo Remove trailing whitespace, add support for eslint Change Docusaurus configuration to support `src` * No need to rename the folder! Change a setting and we're all good to go. * Fixing rebase items * Remove unneccessary markdown file, fix type * Some fonts are hard to read. Others, not so much. Rubik, you've been sidelined. Roboto, into the limelight! * As much as we all love tutorials, I think we all can navigate around a markdown file. Say goodbye, `mdx.md`. * Setup deployment infrastructure * Move docs job from buildkite to travic * Fix travis config * Add vercel token to travis config * Only deploy docs after merge * Docker rust env * Revert "Docker rust env" This reverts commit f84bc208e807aab1c0d97c7588bbfada1fedfa7c. * Build CLI usage from docker * Pacify shellcheck * Run job on PR and new commits for publication * Update README * Fix svg image building * shellcheck Co-authored-by: Michael Vines <mvines@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Ryan Shea <rmshea@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: publish-docs.sh <maintainers@solana.com>
2.8 KiB
title
| title |
|---|
| Slashing rules |
Unlike Proof of Work PoW where off-chain capital expenses are already
deployed at the time of block construction/voting, PoS systems require
capital-at-risk to prevent a logical/optimal strategy of multiple chain voting.
We intend to implement slashing rules which, if broken, result some amount of
the offending validator's deposited stake to be removed from circulation. Given
the ordering properties of the PoH data structure, we believe we can simplify
our slashing rules to the level of a voting lockout time assigned per vote.
I.e. Each vote has an associated lockout time PoH duration that represents
a duration by any additional vote from that validator must be in a PoH that
contains the original vote, or a portion of that validator's stake is
slashable. This duration time is a function of the initial vote PoH count and
all additional vote PoH counts. It will likely take the form:
Lockouti\(PoHi, PoHj\) = PoHj + K \* exp\(\(PoHj - PoHi\) / K\)
Where PoHi is the height of the vote that the lockout is to be applied to and PoHj is the height of the current vote on the same fork. If the validator submits a vote on a different PoH fork on any PoHk where k > j > i and PoHk < Lockout(PoHi, PoHj), then a portion of that validator's stake is at risk of being slashed.
In addition to the functional form lockout described above, early
implementation may be a numerical approximation based on a First In, First Out
FIFO data structure and the following logic:
- FIFO queue holding 32 votes per active validator
- new votes are pushed on top of queue
`push_front` - expired votes are popped off top
`pop_front` - as votes are pushed into the queue, the lockout of each queued vote doubles
- votes are removed from back of queue if
queue.len() > 32 - the earliest and latest height that has been removed from the back of the queue should be stored
It is likely that a reward will be offered as a % of the slashed amount to any node that submits proof of this slashing condition being violated to the PoH.
Partial Slashing
In the schema described so far, when a validator votes on a given PoH stream, they are committing themselves to that fork for a time determined by the vote lockout. An open question is whether validators will be hesitant to begin voting on an available fork if the penalties are perceived too harsh for an honest mistake or flipped bit.
One way to address this concern would be a partial slashing design that results in a slashable amount as a function of either:
- the fraction of validators, out of the total validator pool, that were also
slashed during the same time period
ala Casper - the amount of time since the vote was cast (e.g. a linearly increasing % of total deposited as slashable amount over time), or both.
This is an area currently under exploration.